

J'ai pas de TUN et je m'en TAP


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What a VPN provides




Who uses VPNs ?

- Anti Hadopi people, to download as crazy
- People under restrictive laws (China, Iran, etc)
- People who want to hide themselves

Who ?

Simply people who don't trust their ISPs

And they are right...




An attacker will not see the traffic being transferred in the VPN tunnel (VPN provides encryption).

TUN / TAP

- VPNs tend to use TUN / TAP provided by the kernel as a virtual network kernel device.
- TAP (as in network TAP): simulates an Ethernet device and it operates with layer 2 - same switch
- TUN (network TUNnel): simulates a network layer device and it operates with layer 3 packets - same router

Simpletun^[1] is a very tiny implementation to understand how it works.

The OSI layers



An oversimplified view:

- TAP: you will have a MAC address and an IP address.
- TUN: you will have only an IP address.
- We won't take into account the encapsulation.

tic-TAP attack

- Would you let a stranger use your private network ?
- VPN providers offer TAP devices, because they are simpler to deploy.

TAP == LAN

Your computer behaves the same as if it were on your LAN !

So what ?

- Your computer will broadcast a lot of information to the broadcast / multicast address.
- Layer 2 attacks are now possible: Man in the middle (ARP poisoning, STP attacks, etc).

A privacy issue

- A lot of people put their firstname/lastname as their machine name, Windows will broadcast them (LLMNR protocol^[6]).
- You are not anonymous anymore.
- (Although Windows 7 doesn't really trust TAP)...

The stats before the MITM


Display filter: none

Protocol	% Packets	Packets	% Bytes	Bytes	Mbit/s	End Packets	End Bytes	...
▼ Frame	100.00 %	3319	100.00 %	510931	0.056	0	0	
▼ Ethernet	100.00 %	3319	100.00 %	510931	0.056	0	0	
▼ Internet Protocol Version 6	38.69 %	1284	45.35 %	231181	0.025	0	0	
▼ User Datagram Protocol	25.76 %	855	38.00 %	194179	0.021	0	0	
Hypertext Transfer Protocol	18.05 %	599	31.90 %	162981	0.018	599	162981	
Domain Name Service	4.40 %	146	2.86 %	14630	0.002	146	14630	
DHCPv6	3.31 %	110	3.24 %	16568	0.002	110	16568	
Internet Control Message Protocol v6	12.93 %	429	7.24 %	37002	0.004	429	37002	
▼ Internet Protocol Version 4	37.90 %	1258	48.38 %	246696	0.027	0	0	
▼ User Datagram Protocol	37.27 %	1237	48.06 %	245546	0.027	0	0	
▼ NetBIOS Datagram Service	7.74 %	257	10.99 %	56143	0.006	0	0	
▼ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)	7.74 %	257	10.99 %	56143	0.006	0	0	
▼ SMB MailSlot Protocol	7.74 %	257	10.99 %	56143	0.006	0	0	
Microsoft Windows Browser Protocol	7.74 %	257	10.99 %	56143	0.006	257	56143	
Domain Name Service	5.06 %	168	2.97 %	15192	0.002	168	15192	
Common Unix Printing System (CUPS) Browsing Protocol	0.15 %	5	0.20 %	1023	0.000	5	1023	
NetBIOS Name Service	12.11 %	402	7.29 %	37236	0.004	402	37236	
Hypertext Transfer Protocol	8.44 %	280	20.66 %	105556	0.012	280	105556	
Data	1.81 %	60	3.31 %	16931	0.002	60	16931	
Bootstrap Protocol	0.30 %	10	0.67 %	3420	0.000	10	3420	
Dropbox LAN sync Discovery Protocol	1.66 %	55	1.97 %	10045	0.001	55	10045	
Internet Group Management Protocol	0.63 %	21	0.23 %	1150	0.000	21	1150	
Address Resolution Protocol	3.14 %	768	6.32 %	32292	0.004	768	32292	
▼ Logical-Link Control	0.27 %	9	0.15 %	762	0.000	0	0	
▼ Internetwork Packet eXchange	0.27 %	9	0.15 %	762	0.000	0	0	
IPX Routing Information Protocol	0.09 %	3	0.03 %	174	0.000	3	174	
NetBIOS over IPX	0.18 %	6	0.12 %	588	0.000	6	588	

Help Close

Man in the middle

It exists a lot of different ways and (script-kiddies) tools to MITM someone: **arp cache poisoning**. Ettercap^[3] was used here.



After MITM

During a test of 5 minutes:

- Password were stolen: NNMP, POP, HTTP accounts.
- Credentials from sites like Facebook / private trackers (cookies, whole URL).
- A lot of porn sites...
- Samba user and hash(pwd).
- Possibility to kill TCP connections, massively degrade the VPN service.

Looking for you

- If someone (Feds) is looking for you he can just look at your destination IP to know which VPN service you use.
- Create an account to the same VPN provider.
- Do the same attacks as presented.

Can we secure that ?

- VPN providers could provide TUN instead of TAP.
- Layer2 attacks are difficult to protect against: ignore ARP, use static routes, etc.
- On linux, you can use **iptables**^[4] for layer3, **ebtables**^[5] for layer2.

Exchange of emails

Hi,

One of the reason is that TUN requires 4 ips per connection. I cant give you a straight answer but I'll speak to our technical engineer and see he has to say. Can you show me some proof? Print screens or something.

[...]

Hi,

I spoke to my tech engineer and he told me that we can't filter it. If we're gonna use TUN, it takes 4 IPs per connection. Every custom have a /30 net. 1 for customer, 1 for gateway, 1 for broadcast and 1 for net. We'll see if we can install a new VPN with TUN.

Conclusion

- For strong anonymity, don't use a "public" VPN, even if you pay for it.
- Don't do like the lulzsec with the hidemyass provider^[2].
- However, some VPN providers seem to be more security focused (use TUN, have firewalling rules, etc).

Questions ?

Questions ?



[Davide Brini, 2009]

A simplistic, simple-minded, naive tunnelling program using tun/tap interfaces and TCP.

<http://www.cis.syr.edu/wedu/seed/Labs/VPN/files/simpletun.c>



[Hide My Ass, 2011]

The Lulzsec fiasco

<http://blog.hidemyass.com/2011/09/23/lulzsec-fiasco/>



[Ettercap NG 0.7.4-Lazarus, 2011]

Ettercap NG 0.7.4-Lazarus

<http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/>



[iptables]

iptables is the userspace command line program used to configure the Linux 2.4.x and 2.6.x IPv4 packet filtering ruleset.

<http://www.netfilter.org/>



[ebtables]

The ebtables program is a filtering tool for a Linux-based bridging firewall.

<http://ebtables.sourceforge.net/>



[llmnr]

Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)

<https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4795.txt>